Forthcoming in the next issue 6(1)
Stackelberg Assumption vs. Nash Assumption in Partially Cooperative Games
L. Mallozzi, S. Tijs
Abstract: We deal with n-person normal form game where a subset of players decide to cooperate (signatories) and choose strategies by maximizing the aggregate welfare of the coalition members as in International Environmental Agreements (IEA) context. The non-cooperating (non-signatories) players choose their strategies as a Nash equilibrium. In this paper the partial cooperative equilibrium (PCE) under the Nash-Cournot and the Stackelberg assumptions are considered and presented also in the case of non-signatories multiple decision. Some properties are discussed in both situations, particularly the profit of the players are compared.
Keywords: Partial cooperation, Stackelberg assumption, Nash-Cournot assumption, Stackelberg leader’s value
JEL classification: C72, C79
Pollution Control Policy: A Dynamic Taxation Scheme
G. E. Halkos, G. J. Papageorgiou
Abstract: In this paper we investigate a dynamic setting of environmental taxation, for which the government imposes a tax rate in order to internalize externalities caused by polluting firms. The basic model consists of the intertemporal maximization problem for an additively separable utility which is subject to the pollution accumulation constraint. We analyze some various aspects of the same setting such as the leader-follower, the social planning and the simultaneous move game. The model is very simple and has some similarities with capital taxation models. The crucial variables of the model are the tax rate as a control and the pollution stock as a state. We discuss a scheme in which polluters adopt Markovian emission strategies with respect to the flows, and the tax rate imposed is, in the most cases, a constant depending on the discount rate. Moreover, computing the time paths for the control and state variables, the welfare index analysis, that follows, reveals substantial inefficiencies caused by the leader-follower setting, compared with the social planning optimal control setting.
Keywords: Pollution control, taxation, dynamic leader-follower games
JEL classification: C61, C62, D43, H21
Endogenous Heterogeneity, the Propagation of Information and Macroeconomic Complexity
Abstract: The economy is an adaptive and evolving complex system. The recognition of this fact has produced, over the last few years, a gradual but firm shift on the direction taken by mainstream economic thought. The representative agent paradigm is giving place to settings of interacting heterogeneous agents, capable of generating dynamic outcomes that are unique for each assumed pattern of interaction. The complexity era, as it is called, requires original insights and innovative approaches, in order to reinterpret the economic reality. This paper intends to contribute to the complexity literature in economics by exploring a popular macroeconomic model (the sticky-information model) from a new angle. Information acquisition by price-setting firms will be endogenously determined in two steps: (i) the competition between almost identical media leads to an irregular pattern of information creation; (ii) once created, information spreads throughout the interested audience following a diffusion process. The consequence is an erratic aggregate pattern of information acquisition that has consequences at a macro level, namely concerning the shape of the Phillips curve, which will change every period. Heterogeneity, self-organization, evolution and out-of-equilibrium dynamics are features that allow to classify the suggested framework as a setting of macroeconomic complexity.
Keywords: Complexity, information production and diffusion, heterogeneity, sticky-information, nonlinear dynamics
JEL classification: E30, E52, D83, D84
Project Management for a Country with Multiple Objectives
W. K. M. Brauers
Abstract: This paper proposes project management for a national economy in search for new projects, even with competition between projects. Traditional Cost-Benefit does not respond to this purpose. Indeed Cost-Benefit is only interested in one specific project and not in a competition between projects. In addition all goals (objectives) have to be translated into money terms, leading sometimes to immoral consequences. On the contrary Multi-Objective Optimization takes care of different objectives, whereas the objectives keep their own units. However different methods exist for the application of Multi-Objective Optimization. The author tested them after their robustness resulting in seven necessary conditions for acceptance. Nevertheless these seven conditions concern only Discrete Optimization and not Continuous Optimization or Interactive Multi-Objective Methods. MOORA (Multi-Objective Optimization by Ratio analysis coupled with Reference Point Theory) and MULTIMOORA (MOORA plus the Full Multiplicative Form), assisted by Ameliorated Nominal Group and Delphi Techniques, satisfy the seven conditions, although in a theoretical way. A simulation exercise illustrates the use of these methods, ideals to be strived for as much as possible.
Keywords: Project management, cost-benefit, multi-objective optimization, robustness, ameliorated nominal group and Delphi techniques, full multiplicative form, MOORA, MULTIMOORA
JEL classification: C44, D81, E17, O22, P11
Cartels in the Kautiliya Arthasastra
Abstract:This paper examines the legal-economic dimension of collusive manipulation of prices from the perspective of the Kautiliya Arthasastra, an ancient Indian treatise on law and statecraft, which is among the oldest sources of information about cartels. It identifies cartels in the treatise, shows that cartels were treated more severely than individuals who manipulated prices, discusses the efficacy of penalties from the perspective of deterrence, and discusses the evolution of relevant laws. The economic analysis presented in the paper throws new light on the controversy surrounding the internal consistency of the Arthasastra. The paper also highlights the need to take note of the moral-legal environment within which pre-modern markets operated before studying them with the help of models developed for modern markets.
Keywords: Arthasastra, collusion, Dharmasastra, economic history, indology, just price, trade
JEL Classification: B11, K21, L41, L51, N45
Citations retrieved from Harzing's Publish or Perish, 2007-2011
Number of citations, Authors, Title, Volume (Issue)
12, F Turnovec, New Measure of Voting Power, 1(1)
11, SZ Alparslan Gok, R Branzei…, Some characterizations of convex interval games, 2(3)
10, MO Hosli, Council decision rules and European Union constitutional design, 2(1)
8, F Turnovec, National, Political and Institutional Influence in European Union Decision Making, 2(2)
8, J Babecký, Aggregate wage flexibility in new EU member states, 2(2)
6, J Fidrmuc…, The outbreak of the Russian banking crisis, 5(1)
4, L Mallozzi, S Tijs, Partial Cooperation and Non-Signatories Multiple Decision, 2(1)
4, N Schofield, Is the Political Economy Stable or Chaotic?, 5(1)
4, R Branzei, G Ferrari, V Fragnelli…, A flow approach to bankruptcy problems, 2(2)
4, DY Kenett, Y Shapira, A Madi…, Dynamics of stock market correlations, 4(3)
3, M Luptáčik, W Koller, B Mahlberg…, Growth and Employment Potentials of Chosen Technology Fields, 2(1)
3, A Garnaev…, Fish Wars: Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Approaches, 2(1)
3, J Zápal, Judging the sustainability of Czech public finances, 1(1)
3, H Nurmi…, More Borda Count Variations for Project Assesment, 2(2)
3, V Fragnelli…, Strategic manipulations and collusions in Knaster procedure, 3(2)
3, N Schofield…, Formal Models of Elections and Political Bargaining, 3(3) 3, N Švarcová…, The Financial Impact of Government Policies on Families with Children in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, 3(1)
2 A Geršl, Political economy of public deficit: Perspectives for constitutional reform, 1(1)
2, S Shikano, Simulating party competition and vote decision under mixed member electoral systems, 3(3)
2, L. Mallozzi, S Tijs, Partial cooperation and multiple non-signatories decision, 2(1)
2, M Zeleny, On the essential multidimensionality of an economic problem: towards tradeoffs-free economics, 3(2)
2, L Cioni, Ranking electoral systems through hierarchical properties ranking, 3(3)
2, M Hrubý, Algorithmic Approaches to Game-theoretical Modeling and Simulation, 2(3)
1, J Kodera, K Sladký…, Neo-Keynesian and Neo-Classical Macroeconomic Models: Stability and Lyapunov Exponents, 1(3)
1, M Bauer, J Chytilová…, Effects of Education on Determinants of High Desired Fertility: Evidence from Ugandan Villages, 1(3)
1, L Krištoufek, Rescaled Range Analysis and Detrended Fluctuation Analysis: Finite Sample Properties and Confidence Intervals, 4(3)
1, J Baruník, L Vácha…, Tail Behavior of the Central European Stock Markets during the Financial Crisis, 4(3)
1, M Viren, Does the Value-Added Tax Shift to Consumption Prices?, 3(2)
1, L Šťastná, Spatial Interdependence of Local Public Expenditures: Selected Evidence from the Czech Republic, 3(1)
1, G Lisi…,Tax Morale, Entrepreneurship, and the Irregular Economy, 5(2)
1, P Jakubík, Credit Risk and the Finnish Economy, 1(3)
1, S Ottone, F Ponzano…, Simulating Voting Rule Reforms for the Italian Parliament: An Economic Perspective, 3(3)
1, H Nurmi, Voting Weights or Agenda Control: Which One Really Matters?, 4(1)
1, G Bergantinos…, On some properties of cost allocation rules in minimum cost spanning tree problems, 2(3)
1, A Derviz, Cross-Border Risk Transmission by a Multinational Bank, 1(1)
1, J Antal…, Exchange Rate Arrangements Prior to Euro Adoption, 1(3)
1, V Fragnelli, The Propensity to Disruption for Evaluating a Parliament, 3(3)
1, CT Albulescu, Economic and Financial Integration of CEECs: The Impact of Financial Instability, 5(1)
1, M Zeleny, Bata Management System: A built-in resilience against crisis at the micro level, 4(1)
1, L Urban, Koordinace hospodářské politiky zemí EU a její meze, 1(2)
1, J Hlaváček…, Poptávková funkce na trhu s pojištěním: porovnání maximalizace paretovské pravděpodobnosti přežití s teorií EUT von Neumanna a Morgensterna s..., 1(2)
Statistics for articles published in the last Vol. 5 (2011)
- 21 accepted articles (16 international, 5 local),
- 18 rejected articles (14 international, 4 local),
- Acceptance rate is 53.8 % (21/39); not significantly different for international articles (53.3%, 16/30) and local articles (55.5%, 5/9).
- The ratio of international to local articles (for accepted articles) is 16 to 5.
- Google Scholar finds 12 citations of articles from this last volume.
We consider a paper to be local if the main affiliation of any author is institution located in the Czech Republic. Otherwise, it is classified as an international article.
List of authors
The updated list of authors together with their affiliations can be downloaded here.
The Czech Economic Review, Vol. 5, No. 3
A new issue of the Czech Economic Review is available online. See table of contents:
The Czech Economic Review 5 (3), 227-230
Dimensions of Political Contestation: Voting in the Council of the European Union before the 2004 Enlargement
M. O. Hosli, M. C. J. Uriot
The Czech Economic Review 5 (3), 231-248
Coalitions in the EU Council: Pitfalls of Multidimensional Analysis
The Czech Economic Review 5 (3), 249-266
Power and Responsibility in Environmental Policy Making
M. J. Holler, W. Wegner
The Czech Economic Review 5 (3), 267-288
Embedding Classical Indices in the FP Family
M. Chessa, V. Fragnelli
The Czech Economic Review 5 (3), 289-305
Optimizing the Efficiency of Weighted Voting Games
The Czech Economic Review 5 (3), 306-323
Voting Experiments: Measuring Vulnerability of Voting Procedures to Manipulation
The Czech Economic Review 5 (3), 324-345
Access statistics (journal homepage 2010-2011)
Most downloaded articles per issue
Vol 5(2), 2011
1. Inflation Convergence and the New Keynesian Phillips Curve in the Czech Republic (140)
2. Tax Morale, Entrepreneurship, and the Irregular Economy (90)
3. Existence of Equilibrium Prices for Discontinuous Excess Demand Correspondences (83)
Vol 5(1), 2011
1. Welfare Improving Coordination of Fiscal and Monetary Policy (234)
2. Economic and Financial Integration of CEECs: The Impact of Financial Instability (211)
3. Is the Political Economy Stable or Chaotic? (203)
Vol 4(3), 2010
1. Dynamics of Stock Market Correlations (475)
2. Nonlinear Inflation Expectations and Endogenous Fluctuations (299)
3. Keynesian Macrodynamics: Convergence, Roads to Instability and the Emergence of Complex Business Fluctuations (294)
Vol. 4(2), 2010
1. Monetary Policy Transmission in Italy: A BVAR Analysis with Sign Restriction (581)
2. Co-determination and Merger Incentives from Transfers of Wealth: Firm Owners vs. Workers (444)
3. Interval Values for Multicriteria Cooperative Games (332)
Vol. 4(1), 2010
1. Game-Theoretic Modeling of Electricity Markets in Central Europe (673)
2. Bata Management System: A Built-In Resilience against Crisis at the Micro Level (656)
3. Public Utilities: Privatization without Regulation (627)
Articles with the most abstract views
Vol 5(2), 2011
1. Inflation Convergence and the New Keynesian Phillips Curve in the Czech Republic (229)
2. Tax Morale, Entrepreneurship, and the Irregular Economy (164)
3. Let Me See You! A Video Experiment on the Social Dimension of Risk Preferences (155)
Vol 5(1), 2011
1. Economic and Financial Integration of CEECs: The Impact of Financial Instability (442)
2. Welfare Improving Coordination of Fiscal and Monetary Policy (424)
3. Is the Political Economy Stable or Chaotic? (415)
Vol 4(3), 2010
1. Dynamics of Stock Market Correlations (855)
2. Tail Behavior of the Central European Stock Markets during the Financial Crisis (619)
3. Rescaled Range Analysis and Detrended Fluctuation Analysis: Finite Sample Properties and Confidence Intervals (612)
Vol. 4(2), 2010
1. Monetary Policy Transmission in Italy: A BVAR Analysis with Sign Restriction (999)
2. Risk-Sharing Externalities and Its Implications for Equity Premium in an Infinite-Horizon Economy (784)
3. Co-determination and Merger Incentives from Transfers of Wealth: Firm Owners vs. Workers (777)
Vol. 4(1), 2010
1. Game-Theoretic Modeling of Electricity Markets in Central Europe (1228)
2. Machiavelli’s Possibility Hypothesis (812)
3. Voting Weights or Agenda Control: Which One Really Matters? (810)
Access statistics (RePEc 2011)
Abstract views and downloads of the journal's articles at RePEc database during the first nine months of 2011 (see link):
Abstract views Downloads
January 2011 171 46
February 2011 166 38
March 2011 215 81
April 2011 191 61
May 2011 255 43
June 2011 111 31
July 2011 187 27
August 2011 159 31
September 2011 131 45
IDEAS/RePEc Simple Impact Factor Journal Ranking
Out of Czech economics journals, our journal has the following position measured by the IDEAS/RePEc Simple Impact Factor:
504. Prague Economic Papers, University of Economics in Prague, 0.271
545. AUCO Czech Economic Review, Charles University in Prague, 0.215
630. Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, Charles University in Prague, 0.140
668. Politická ekonomie, University of Economics in Prague, 0.106
688. Bulletin of the Czech Econometric Society, Czech Econometric Society, 0.091
912 journals are listed in October 2011 ranking (only journals with 50 or more papers and at least one citation are considered). The full ranking is available here.
RePEc (Research Papers in Economics) is a volunteer-driven initiative to create a public-access database that promotes scholarly communication in economics and related disciplines. The database contains information on more than 585,000 items. RePEc is providing ranking of leading economic journals by so called simple impact factor (a ratio of citations by the number of items in the journals, citation counts being adjusted to exclude citations from the journal considered).
AUCO Czech Economic Review in SCOPUS
Starting from 2010, the AUCO Czech Economic Review was accepted for indexation in database SCOPUS, the largest international abstract and citation database of research literature and quality web sources covering nearly 18,000 titles from more than 5,000 publishers. Below we provide a list of links to SCOPUS records of articles in the AUCO Czech Economic Review.
Export date: 26 October 2011
Vol. 5, No. 2:
Danišková, K., Fidrmuc, J.: Inflation convergence and the new Keynesian Phillips curve in the Czech Republic
Lisi, G., Pugno, M.: Tax morale, entrepreneurship, and the irregular economy
Maslowska, A.A.: Quest for the best: How to measure central bank independence and show its relationship with inflation
Bertini, C., Gambarelli, G., Scarelli, A., Varga, Z.: Equilibrium solution in a game between a cooperative and its members
Doležel, P.: Estimating the efficiency of voting in big size committees
Fragnelli, V., Marina, M.E.: Skill and chance in insurance policies
Scalzo, V.: Existence of equilibrium prices for discontinuous excess demand correspondences
Güth, W., Vittoria Levati, M., Ploner, M.: Let me see you! A video experiment on the social dimension of risk preferences
Vol. 5, No. 1:
Fidrmuc, J., Horváth, R.: Editorial
Hallett, A.H., Libich, J., Stehlik, P.: Welfare improving coordination of fiscal and monetary policy
Albulescu, C.T.: Economic and financial integration of CEECs: The impact of financial instability
Fidrmuc, J., Süß, P.J.: The outbreak of the russian banking crisis
Koyuncu, J.Y.: Foreign bank presence and bank spreads: Evidence from Turkey
Schofield, N.: Is the political economy stable or chaotic?
Vol. 4, No. 3:
Vošvrda, M.: Editorial
Chiarella, C., Hung, H., Flaschel, P.: Keynesian Macrodynamics: Convergence, roads to instability and the emergence of complex business fluctuations
Gomes, O.: Nonlinear inflation expectations and endogenous fluctuations
Baruník, J., Vácha, L., Vošvrda, M.: Tail Behavior of the central European stock markets during the financial crisis
Bubák, V.: Forecasting the quantiles of daily equity returns using realized volatility: Evidence from the Czech stock market
Krištoufek, L.: Rescaled range analysis and detrended fluctuation analysis: Finite sample properties and confidence intervals
Kenett, D.Y., Shapira, Y., Madi, A., Bransburg-Zabary, S., Gur-Gershgoren, G., Ben-Jacob, E.: Dynamics of stock market correlations
Baruník, J.: L. E. Calvet & A. J. Fisher, Multifractal volatility: Theory, forecasting, and pricing
Doležel, P.: Workshop, Voting, power, and manipulation
Vol. 4, No. 2:
Coscollá, M.P., Granero, L.M.: Co-determination and merger incentives from transfers of wealth: Firm owners vs. workers
Migliardo, C.: Monetary policy transmission in Italy: A BVAR analysis with sign restriction
Ohno, H.: Risk-Sharing Externalities and its implications for equity premium in an infinite-horizon economy
Pieri, G., Pusillo, L.: Interval values for multicriteria cooperative games
Mielcová, E.: The Uncertainty invoting power: The case of the Czech Parliament 1996-2004
Doležel, P.: M. Luptáčik, Mathematical optimization and economic analysis
Vol. 4, No. 1:
Nurmi, H.: Voting weights or agenda control: Which one really matters?
Holler, M.J., Marciano, A.: Machiavelli's possibility hypothesis
Hrubý, M., Čambala, P., Toufar, J.: Game-theoretic modeling of electricity markets in Central Europe
Tarola, O.: Public utilities: Privatization without regulation
Gertler, P., Senaj, M.: Downward wage rigidities in Slovakia
Zelený, M.: Bata Management system: A Built-in resilience against crisis at the micro level Turnovec, F.: International conference on multilevel governance and democracy in the EU
Journal impact analysis by Harzing's Publish or Perish
Harzinng's Publish or Perish is a software program that retrieves and analyzes academic citations (authors’ impact and journals’ impact). It uses Google Scholar to obtain the raw citations, then analyzes these and presents the statistics. For MS Windows free installation, click here.
Citation metrics results
Top 10 cited articles
Number of citations - Author(s), Title, Year, Volume (Issue), Pages
11 - F. Turnovec: New Measure of Voting Power, 2007, 1(1), 4-14.
8 - J. Babecký: Aggregate Wage Flexibility in New EU Member States, 2008, 2(2), 123-145.
7 - M.O. Hosli: Council Decision Rules and European Union Constitutional Design, 2008, 2(1), 76-79.
5 - J. Fidrmuc, J.P. Suss: The Outbreak of the Russian Banking Crisis, 2011, 5(1), 46-63.
4 - F. Turnovec: National, Political and Institutional Influence in European Union Decision Making, 2008, 2(2), 154-173.
4 - L. Mallozzi: Partial Cooperation and Non-Signatories Multiple Decision, 2008, 2(1), 21-27.
4 - N. Schofield: Is the Political Economy Stable or Chaotic?, 2011, 5(1), 76-93.
3 - M. Luptáčik, W. Koller, B. Mahlberg, H.W. Schneider: Growth and Employment Potentials of Chosen Technology Fields, 2008, 2(1), 41-75.
3 - J. Zápal: Judging the Sustainability of Czech Public Finances, 2007, 1(1), 15-31.
3 - V. Fragnelli, M.E. Marina: Strategic Manipulations and Collusions in Knaster Procedure, 2009, 3(2), 143-153.