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Forthcoming in the next issue 8(3)

09/12/2014

Relationship Lending, Bank Competition and Financial Stability

J.-P. Niinimäki

Abstract: This paper explores the effects of relationship lending on bank stability under perfect bank competition. Relationship banking generates profitable old lending relationships, which ease the stress to search and monitor new borrowers, and create great charter values for banks even under bank competition. These everlasting charter values mitigate risk-taking incentives improving finan-cial stability. We find the maximum growth speed for banks so that they will avoid risk taking, and discover the optimal equity capital requirement: new banks and rapidly growing banks should have relatively more capital.

Keywords: Relationship lending, bank competition, financial stability, charter value, bank capital requirements
JEL classification: G21, G22, G28 

The role of Trust in Determining the Propensity to Join Unofficial Strikes

G. Ruiu

Abstract: This paper offers a contribution to the literature on labour strikes by analysing the effect of trust in labour disputes. We maintain that the higher (or lower) the level of confidence that workers place in unions (or firms), the more likely it is that they will be willing to participate in an unofficial strike. A very simple model is presented to clarify this idea. Using WVS data, we also empirically show that the probability of having or being willing to participate in unofficial strikes increases (or decreases) as the level of confidence placed in labour unions (or firms) increases, with the effect of confidence in labour unions being larger than that of confidence in firms.

Keywords: Unofficial strike, trust, labour union, collective bargaining, self-serving bias
JEL classification: J01, J52

Bargaining Structures and Agendas in an Unconstrained Hotelling Model

D. Buccella

Abstract: The present paper investigates the effects of bargaining structures and agendas on the quality differentiation/ location in the final-goods market. The framework is a unionized duopoly industry in the context of an unconstrained Hotelling linear city model. The presence of labor union(s) and the bargaining processes (i.e., centralized vs. decentralized structure; right-to-manage vs. participatory framework agenda) change the locational incentives of the firms with respect to the case of exogenous production costs. The results reveal that the effect of centralization on the two bargaining agendas is diametrically opposed. More specifically, in the participatory framework, centralization is a centrifugal force, while it is a centripetal force in the right-to-manage. The social welfare consequences are also briefly discussed.

Keywords: spatial competition, bargaining, firms’ locations, unionized oligopoly
JEL classification: C72, D43, J51, L13  


The Czech Economic Review, Vol. 8, No. 2

27/10/2014

A new issue of the Czech Economic Review is available online. See table of contents:

Articles

Aggregating and Updating Information
H. Salonen
The Czech Economic Review 8 (2), 55-67

The Discrete Charm of Uniform Linear Pricing of an Input Production Joint Venture
G. Rossini, C. Vergari
The Czech Economic Review 8 (2), 68-83

Refining the Information Function Method: Instrument and Application
D. Qin
The Czech Economic Review 8 (2), 84-101

To view, download, or recommend a single article, click on the article title. To unsubscribe, please fill in the form in the left column (Table of Contents Alert) on the journal homepage.


Forthcoming in the next issue 8(2)

15/10/2014

Aggregating and Updating Information

H. Salonen

Abstract: We study information aggregation problems where to a set of measures a single measure of the same dimension is assigned. The collection of measures could represent the beliefs of agents about the state of the world, and the aggregate would then represent the beliefs of the population. Individual measures could also represent the connectedness of agents in a social network, and the aggregate would reflect the importance of each individual. We characterize the aggregation rule that resembles the Nash welfare function. In the special case of probability aggregation problems, this rule is the only one that satisfies Bayesian updating and some well-known axioms discussed in the literature.

Keywords: Belief aggregation, belief updating, Nash welfare function
JEL classification: C71, D63, D74  

The Discrete Charm of Uniform Linear Pricing of an Input Production Joint Venture

G. Rossini, C. Vergari

Abstract: A popular way of obtaining essential inputs is based on the establishment of an input production joint venture (IPJV) in the upstream (U) section of the vertical chain of production by firms competing and selling final goods downstream (D). Different governances may be designed for the management of an IPJV according to the ownership structure, the degree of delegation granted to the IPJV by parent firms and the extent of competition in the D market. Industry optimal arrangements with nonlinear pricing may be hard to implement and may be banned by regulators, mainly in the case of minimal delegationbased on coordination (collusion) among the D firms. A handy and endurable governance turns out to be maximal delegation, i.e., an independent IPJV, seasoned with linear uniform pricing, even if this solution may contain some inefficiency.

Keywords: Input production joint venture, nonlinear pricing, product differentiation, delegation
JEL classification: L24, L42

Refining the Information Function Method: Instrument and Application

D. Qin

Abstract: Information function method is a powerful tool for analyzing the information requirements of social welfare functions. However, the original information function provides only a coarse description of information structure. In this article, we propose a refinement of this method by changing the range of the information function. We also analyze the role of partially relevant information in preference aggregation through an application of the refined version of the information function method.

Keywords: Preference aggregation, independence condition, information function, partially relevant information
JEL classification: D71  


Recently citing journals (Scopus, 2013-2014)

01/10/2014

ECONOMICS
  • Annals of Operations Research
  • Asian Economic Journal
  • Czech Journal of Economics and Finance
  • Economic Modelling
  • Economica
  • Energy Economics
  • Global Finance Journal
  • Human Systems Management
  • International Game Theory Review
  • Journal of Cultural Economics
  • Journal of Economic Psychology
  • Lex Localis
  • Romanian Journal of Economic Forecasting
  • Scandinavian Journal of Economics
  • Socio-Economic Review 
INTERDISCIPLINARY
  • Atmospheric Research
  • Entropy
  • Fluctuation and Noise Letters
  • Kongzhi yu Juece/Control and Decision
  • Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
  • PLoS ONE
  • Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews

The Czech Economic Review, Vol. 8, No. 1

27/08/2014

A new issue of the Czech Economic Review is available online. See table of contents:

Editorial
M. Gregor
The Czech Economic Review 8 (1), 5-6

Articles

Stable Bank Cooperation for Cost Reduction Problem
E. Parilina, A. Sedakov
The Czech Economic Review 8 (1), 7-25

On the Turnpike Property of the Modified Golden Rule
D. Dai
The Czech Economic Review 8 (1), 26-32

Expectations of Bailout and Collective Moral Hazard
M. Horniaček
The Czech Economic Review 8 (1), 33-54

To view, download, or recommend a single article, click on the article title. To unsubscribe, please fill in the form in the left column (Table of Contents Alert) on the journal homepage.


Forthcoming in the next issue 8(1)

11/08/2014

Stable Bank Cooperation for Cost Reduction Problem

E. Parilina, A. Sedakov

Abstract: In the paper we consider a problem of bank cost reduction by joint usage of ATMs. In coalition case, we assume that cooperation may be naturally restricted by a coalition structure. A question of stability of a coalition structure with respect to the Shapley value is investigated. Statements about the configuration of stable coalition structures are proposed. We also consider special cases in which their existence is proved.

Keywords: coalition structure, stability, cost allocation problem, Shapley value, Aumann–Dreze value
JEL classification: C71

On the Turnpike Property of the Modified Golden Rule

D. Dai

Abstract: Stationary and ergodic probability distribution is derived and the stochastic balanced path of capital accumulation is defined via corresponding martingale path. Moreover, stochastic version of asymptotic turnpike theorem is established in the sense of uniform topology and also neighborhood type of stochastic turnpike theorem is demonstrated in the sense of ergodic measure.

Keywords: stochastic growth, modified golden rule, turnpike theorem, ergodic consumption, martingale-path of capital accumulation
JEL classification: C60; E13; E22

Expectations of Bailout and Collective Moral Hazard

M. Horniaček

Abstract: We analyze infinite horizon stochastic game with discounting of future single period payoffs that models interaction between Cournot duopolists producing differentiated products. There are two states of demand for output of each firm. The probabilities of their occurrence depend on random factors and on investing or not investing into product innovation. If the low state of demand occurs for output of each firm the government, which does not observe firms' investments into product innovation, bails out each firm with a positive output. A weakly renegotiation-proof perfect public equilibrium is the solution concept that we apply. It is a perfect public equilibrium in which no two replaceable continuation equilibrium payoff vectors are strictly Pareto ranked. Taking into account expected bail out, there exists a weakly renegotiation-proof perfect public equilibrium with strictly Pareto efficient equilibrium payoff vector, in which, along the equilibrium path, the firms collude on not investing into product innovation.

Keywords: bailout, innovation, perfect public equilibrium, weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium, stochastic game
JEL classification: C73; D43


Elsevier has released 2013 journal metrics

29/07/2014

Elsevier has released the updated journal metrics for the years 2011-2013 for journals indexed in Scopus. The scores for the Czech Economic Review are as follows:

  • SNIP 2013 = 0.340 (the previous scores are 0.030 and 0.383)
  • SJR 2013 = 0.158 (the previous scores are 0.104 and 0.172)
  • IPP 2013 = 0.280 (the previous scores are 0.059 and 0.306)

By SJR 2013, CER ranks 618. out 890 journals indexed in Scopus. For details about the scores, see journalmetrics.com.


JournalGuide

19/05/2014

We encourage all authors of the papers reviewed at CER to rate our journal in the JournalGuide. JournalGuide is a free tool that helps researchers to evaluate scholarly journals. JournalGuide is a division of Research Square, which makes it a sister company to Rubriq (independent peer review) and AJE (manuscript preparation services).


We welcome new members of the Editorial Board

12/03/2014

Three distinguished scholars have recently joined our Editorial Board:

  • Prof. Michael Berlemann is Professor of Political Economy and Emprical Economics at Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg and a CESifo researcher. Recently he has published articles in Journal of Applied Econometrics, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, European Journal of Political Economy, and Public Choice.
  • Prof. Stefan Napel is Chair of Microeconomics at University of Bayreuth with interests in bargaining, measurement of power, political economy of the European Union, inequality and social mobility, and industrial organization. Recently he published his work in the Economic Journal, Journal of the European Economic Association, Journal of Economic Theory, and Games and Economic Behavior
  • Prof. Christopher Weiss is Professor of Economics and Head of the Institute for Economic Policy and Industrial Economics at Vienna University of Economics and Business. His work has appeared, among others, in Regional Science and Urban Economics, Applied Economics, Journal of Agricultural Economics, and European Journal of Political Economy.

The Review of Economics becomes our new partner journal

14/02/2014

The Review of Economics (ISSN 0948-5139) is a peer-reviewed general interest journal and publishes articles from all fields of economics. Only articles with a strong policy focus are considered for publication. The Review of Economics will consider papers that are based on (i) a well defined theoretical model (ii) an empirical analysis or (iii) an experimental or (iv) an evidence-based framework.  The journal is included in the list of journals used to construct the German Handelsblatt-Ranking of individual researchers and economics faculties. The journal was formely known as Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftswissenschaften.


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