Forthcoming in the next issue 8(1)
Stable Bank Cooperation for Cost Reduction Problem
E. Parilina, A. Sedakov
Abstract: In the paper we consider a problem of bank cost reduction by joint usage of ATMs. In coalition case, we assume that cooperation may be naturally restricted by a coalition structure. A question of stability of a coalition structure with respect to the Shapley value is investigated. Statements about the configuration of stable coalition structures are proposed. We also consider special cases in which their existence is proved.
Keywords: coalition structure, stability, cost allocation problem, Shapley value, Aumann–Dreze value
JEL classification: C71
On the Turnpike Property of the Modified Golden Rule
Abstract: Stationary and ergodic probability distribution is derived and the stochastic balanced path of capital accumulation is defined via corresponding martingale path. Moreover, stochastic version of asymptotic turnpike theorem is established in the sense of uniform topology and also neighborhood type of stochastic turnpike theorem is demonstrated in the sense of ergodic measure.
Keywords: stochastic growth, modified golden rule, turnpike theorem, ergodic consumption, martingale-path of capital accumulation
JEL classification: C60; E13; E22
Expectations of Bailout and Collective Moral Hazard
Abstract: We analyze infinite horizon stochastic game with discounting of future single period payoffs that models interaction between Cournot duopolists producing differentiated products. There are two states of demand for output of each firm. The probabilities of their occurrence depend on random factors and on investing or not investing into product innovation. If the low state of demand occurs for output of each firm the government, which does not observe firms' investments into product innovation, bails out each firm with a positive output. A weakly renegotiation-proof perfect public equilibrium is the solution concept that we apply. It is a perfect public equilibrium in which no two replaceable continuation equilibrium payoff vectors are strictly Pareto ranked. Taking into account expected bail out, there exists a weakly renegotiation-proof perfect public equilibrium with strictly Pareto efficient equilibrium payoff vector, in which, along the equilibrium path, the firms collude on not investing into product innovation.
Keywords: bailout, innovation, perfect public equilibrium, weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium, stochastic game
JEL classification: C73; D43
Elsevier has released 2013 journal metrics
Elsevier has released the updated journal metrics for the years 2011-2013 for journals indexed in Scopus. The scores for the Czech Economic Review are as follows:
- SNIP 2013 = 0.340 (the previous scores are 0.030 and 0.383)
- SJR 2013 = 0.158 (the previous scores are 0.104 and 0.172)
- IPP 2013 = 0.280 (the previous scores are 0.059 and 0.306)
By SJR 2013, CER ranks 618. out 890 journals indexed in Scopus. For details about the scores, see journalmetrics.com.
We encourage all authors of the papers reviewed at CER to rate our journal in the JournalGuide. JournalGuide is a free tool that helps researchers to evaluate scholarly journals. JournalGuide is a division of Research Square, which makes it a sister company to Rubriq (independent peer review) and AJE (manuscript preparation services).
We welcome new members of the Editorial Board
Three distinguished scholars have recently joined our Editorial Board:
- Prof. Michael Berlemann is Professor of Political Economy and Emprical Economics at Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg and a CESifo researcher. Recently he has published articles in Journal of Applied Econometrics, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, European Journal of Political Economy, and Public Choice.
- Prof. Stefan Napel is Chair of Microeconomics at University of Bayreuth with interests in bargaining, measurement of power, political economy of the European Union, inequality and social mobility, and industrial organization. Recently he published his work in the Economic Journal, Journal of the European Economic Association, Journal of Economic Theory, and Games and Economic Behavior.
- Prof. Christopher Weiss is Professor of Economics and Head of the Institute for Economic Policy and Industrial Economics at Vienna University of Economics and Business. His work has appeared, among others, in Regional Science and Urban Economics, Applied Economics, Journal of Agricultural Economics, and European Journal of Political Economy.
The Review of Economics becomes our new partner journal
The Review of Economics (ISSN 0948-5139) is a peer-reviewed general interest journal and publishes articles from all fields of economics. Only articles with a strong policy focus are considered for publication. The Review of Economics will consider papers that are based on (i) a well defined theoretical model (ii) an empirical analysis or (iii) an experimental or (iv) an evidence-based framework. The journal is included in the list of journals used to construct the German Handelsblatt-Ranking of individual researchers and economics faculties. The journal was formely known as Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftswissenschaften.
For local authors: We have received an official confirmation that a CER article is currently valued by 10 points by the Research, Development and Innovation Council of the Czech Republic.
Statistics of the last 6 years
- 72 articles accepted (50 international, 22 local)
- 78 articles rejected (64 international, 14 local)
- 48% is the acceptance rate.
- 69% is the share of the international articles among the accepted articles.
Notes: We consider a paper to be local if affiliation of any author is located in the Czech Republic. Otherwise, it is classified as an international article. In the statistics, we do not include the pilot year 2007 (Vol. 1).
Citations in impacted journals
At the moment, the Web of Knowledge identifies citations to the CER from the following journals:
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF FINANCIAL ANALYSIS
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
GROUP DECISION AND NEGOTIATION
JOURNAL OF CULTURAL ECONOMICS
JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS
MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES
SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE
THEORY AND DECISION
ASIAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
BALTIC JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
CZECH JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE
ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION
EKONOMSKA ISTRAZIVANJA-ECONOMIC RESEARCH
EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS
PRAGUE ECONOMIC PAPERS
ROMANIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC FORECASTING
CENTRAL EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
CONTROL AND CYBERNETICS
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & DECISION MAKING
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF UNCERTAINTY FUZZINESS AND KNOWLEDGE-BASED SYSTEMS
MATHEMATICAL AND COMPUTER MODELLING
OMEGA-INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
PHYSICA A-STATISTICAL MECHANICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS
RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REVIEWS
The most cited articles in Scopus
The number of citations in Scopus (since 2010 - Volume 4)
IDEAS/RePEc Simple Impact Factor
Out of Czech economics journals, our journal has the following position measured by the IDEAS/RePEc Simple Impact Factor:
514. Czech Economic Review 0.676
601. Prague Economic Papers 0.481
610. Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver) 0.472
824. Politická ekonomie 0.183
837. Bulletin of the Czech Econometric Society 0.173
1262 journals are listed in January 2014 ranking (only journals with 50 or more papers and at least one citation are considered). The full ranking is available here.
RePEc (Research Papers in Economics) is a volunteer-driven initiative to create a public-access database that promotes scholarly communication in economics and related disciplines. The database contains information on about 1.4 million research pieces. RePEc is providing ranking of leading economic journals by so called simple impact factor (a ratio of citations by the number of items in the journals, citation counts being adjusted to exclude citations from the journal considered).