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Volume 6, Issue 1

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Stackelberg Assumption vs. Nash Assumption in Partially Cooperative Games

Mallozzi, Lina; Tijs, Stef

Year: 2012   Volume: 6   Issue: 1   Pages: 5-13

Abstract: We deal with n-person normal form games where a subset of players decide to cooperate (signatories) and choose strategies by maximizing the aggregate welfare of the coalition members as in International Environmental Agreements (IEA) context. The non-cooperating (non-signatories) players choose their strategies as a Nash equilibrium. In this paper the partial cooperative equilibrium (PCE) under the Nash-Cournot and the Stackelberg assumptions are considered and presented also in the case of non-signatories multiple decision. Some properties are discussed in both situations, particularly the profit of the players are compared.

JEL classification: C72, C79

Keywords: Partial cooperation, Stackelberg assumption, Nash-Cournot assumption, Stackelberg leader’s value

RePEc: http://ideas.repec.org/a/fau/aucocz/au2012_005.html

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