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Volume 6, Issue 3

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Dynamic Collusion and Collusion Games in Knaster’s Procedure

Briata, Federica; Dall’Aglio, Marco; Fragnelli, Vito

Year: 2012   Volume: 6   Issue: 3   Pages: 199-208

Abstract: In this paper we study the collusion in Knaster’s procedure, starting from the paper of Fragnelli and Marina (2009). First, we introduce a suitable dynamic mechanism, so that the coalition enlargement is always non-disadvantageous. Then, we define a new class of TU-games in order to evaluate the collusion power of the agents.

JEL classification: C70, C71

Keywords: Fairness, Knaster’s procedure, complete risk aversion, dynamic coalition formation

RePEc: http://ideas.repec.org/a/fau/aucocz/au2012_199.html

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