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Volume 4, Issue 1


Voting Weights or Agenda Control: Which One Really Matters?

Nurmi, Hannu

Year: 2010   Volume: 4   Issue: 1   Pages: 5-17

Abstract: Much of the EU institution literature deals with the distribution of voting power in the Council and European Parliament. The increasingly sophisticated models on EU decision making tend to overlook issues pertaining agenda formation and control in various decision making bodies. This article argues that agenda control is extremely important in all collective decision making bodies. Indeed, agenda control may render the voting power distribution issue largely irrelevant.

JEL classification: D02, D70

Keywords: Agenda control, amendment procedure, no-show paradox, successive procedure

RePEc: http://ideas.repec.org/a/fau/aucocz/au2010_005.html

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