Wallenstein’s Power Problem and Its Consequences
Year: 2008 Volume: 2 Issue: 3 Pages: 197-218
Abstract: This paper wants to be both: an introduction to game-theoretical thinking as well as a game-theoretical discussion of Schiller’s Wallenstein. Note that the intention of this article is to convince theatergoers and people who work in the theatrical arts that it is worthwhile to study some game theory. Others will hopefully profit from the unusual Wallenstein interpretation. It is not this article’s purpose to teach game theorists, but rather to inspire applications. The drama is depicted as a game and consequently submitted to a formal analysis that is based on the economic concept of rationality. Weber’s definition of power is operationalized and applied to Wallenstein’s decision situation.
JEL classification: C72, D82, K00
Keywords: Power, bargaining, mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, theater, Wallenstein
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