Quicksearch
Table of contents alert
Do you want to receive an email alert about new issue?



   
Indexing
CEEOL DigLib DOAJ EBSCO EconBiz EconLit RePEc Scopus Socolar JournalGuide
Statistics
Total downloads:278978
Total abstract views:405001

Volume 8, Issue 3

top

Bargaining Structures and Agendas in an Unconstrained Hotelling Model

Buccella, Domenico

Year: 2014   Volume: 8   Issue: 3   Pages: 149-167

Abstract: The present paper investigates the effects of bargaining structures and agendas on the quality differentiation/location in the final-goods market. The framework is a unionized duopoly industry in the context of an unconstrained Hotelling linear city model. The presence of labor union(s) and the bargaining processes (i.e., centralized vs. decentralized structure; right-to-manage vs. participatory framework agenda) change the locational incentives of the firms with respect to the case of exogenous production costs. The results reveal that the effect of centralization on the two bargaining agendas is diametrically opposed. More specifically, in the participatory framework, centralization is a centrifugal force, while it is a centripetal force in the right-to-manage. The social welfare consequences are also briefly discussed.

JEL classification: C72, D43, J51, L13

Keywords: Spatial competition, bargaining, firms’ locations, unionized oligopoly

RePEc: https://ideas.repec.org/a/fau/aucocz/au2014_149.html

pdf [PDF] print Print   Recommend to others Recommend to others
bottom